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Negro citizens, North and South, who saw in the Thirteenth Amendment a 
promise of freedom—freedom to “go and come at pleasure” and to “buy and 
sell when they please”—would be left with “a mere paper guarantee” if Congress 
were powerless to assure that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the 
same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man.1
—Justice Potter Stewart
Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co. (1968)
Those who say “What’s mine is mine, and what’s yours is yours”; this is 
the average [type of person], though some say this is the type predominant in 
Sodom.2
—Pirke Avot (Ethics of the Fathers) 5:13
Introduction
Two robots walk into a bar. I know, it sounds like a joke. But I am talking 
about the famous scene in Star Wars in which C-3PO and R2-D2 try to follow 
Luke Skywalker into a tavern. They are looking for a pilot who can take them to 
the planet Alderaan to fight the evil Emperor. Obi-Wan Kenobi and Chewbacca 
enter the bar with no problem but when Luke crosses the threshold with the 
androids, the barkeep stops them with a sneer. “Hey, we don’t serve their kind 
here,” he says to Luke, refusing to speak directly to the androids.3 “Listen, why 
don’t you wait out by the speeder,” Luke tells them, “we don’t want any trouble.”4
The scene is surreal. Moments before this act of exclusion, we are treated 
to the sight of many weird and wondrous beings filling the bar. They obviously 
come from different planets and are designed to intrigue and surprise us by their 
diversity. The scene is both familiar and strange. The band plays jazz we find 
familiar but the musicians look like praying mantises on steroids. It is our world 
and it is not our world. The camera moves to show us all kinds of creatures. In 
the face of the incredible multiplicity of beings of all sizes and shapes, the act of 
exclusion is at once familiar and shocking. At the same time, the gesture strikes 
the viewer as palpably absurd. Why admit the fellow who looks like the devil, the 
1 Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that 
mandated that all citizens have the rights of white citizens in private sales of property) (footnotes omitted).
2 ethicS oF the SaGeS: Pirke avot—annotated & exPlained, 5:13 (Rami Shapiro trans., 2006) [hereinafter 
PIRKE AVOT].
3 Star WarS (Lucasfilm 1977).
4 Id.
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praying mantises, and the belligerent guy who starts a fight with Luke, but then 
draw the line at intelligent robots? Why would they, alone among the diverse 
clientele, be unwelcome? We realize we know nothing about the history and cul-
ture of a world that would be so welcoming to creatures that would surprise and 
frighten us while excluding androids we have come to view as our companions 
and comrades.
“We don’t serve their kind here.”5 This is a simple exercise of property rights. 
Or is it? Recently one of my students went to a club in Boston with two of his 
friends. The bouncer at the door would not let them in. “We don’t want your 
kind here,” he said, or something to that effect. It was Star Wars all over again. 
My student and his friends are Korean and that apparently bugged the bouncer. 
They were confused and asked him to explain and he said again that they were 
not wanted there. They asked to see the manager and, amazingly in this day and 
age, the manager backed up the bouncer. Not only did he not let them in, he 
used a racial epithet to express his animus toward Asians. It was 2013 and they 
were excluded from a bar in Boston because of their race.
I. Public Accommodations Law and Private Property
We are here to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, of which Title II was the public accommodations law. Congress passed 
that law about a month after my tenth birthday. Fifty years is a long time but 
we are not talking about ancient history here. I recall segregation; I recall the 
passage of the public accommodations law. And fifty years is apparently not 
enough to change our understanding of property—at least not completely. In 
recent months, we have seen much controversy over a baker who did not want 
to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple and a photographer who did not 
want to take photographs at a same-sex wedding.6 They claimed both expres-
sive and religious liberty to justify denying services to paying customers and they 
also asserted the right to run their own businesses as they saw fit, retaining the 
right to exclude customers whose identity or lifestyle they found objectionable.7 
5 Id.
6 See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013); Craig, No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. 
Civ. Rights Comm’n Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/initial_decision_case_
no._cr_2013-0008.pdf.
7 See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 60 (“Elane Photography explains that it ‘did not want to convey 
. . . the story of an event celebrating an understanding of marriage that conflicts with [the owners’] beliefs.’”); 
Craig, No. CR 2013-0008 (“Respondents . . . contend that their refusal was based solely upon a deeply 
held religious conviction that marriage is only between a man and a woman . . . Respondents contend that 
application of the law to them . . . would violate their rights of free speech and free exercise of religion . . . .”).
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A similar claim was made by a web-based adoption service that sought to deny 
participation by same-sex couples.8 These businesses were open to the general 
public but apparently not all of the general public; the owners claimed the right 
to be selective in their choice of customers and they argued that constraints on 
their choice burdened their expressive and religious freedoms.9 As owners of 
property, they had the right to exclude and to waive that right selectively and in 
line with their religious values.10
If such arguments had been accepted in 1964, then we might still have 
segregated restaurants, hotels, movie theaters, and pools in the South. After all, 
segregationists claimed Biblical support for their position and the right to exclude 
unwanted strangers from their property was a core element of the claim. This 
argument has not only been revived by businesses seeking to deny services 
to LGBT11 customers but apparently has some traction with five members of 
the Supreme Court. The recent case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc.12 allowed 
a closely held corporation to deny insurance coverage for contraception to its 
employees because the owners of the corporation held religious beliefs under 
which such contraception was a form of abortion and that facilitating such insur-
ance made them complicit in murder.13
For my purpose here, what matters about the Hobby Lobby decision is the 
way the Justices in the majority conceptualized property rights. Similar to how 
the spending of money is now the equivalent of speech for First Amendment 
purposes,14 the purchase of such health insurance represents an impermissible 
burden on the religious expression of the corporation and hence its owners. 
8 Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
9 See id. at 1058 (“Defendants claim that compelling them to post plaintiffs’ profiles on their “web 
publication” . . . would similarly constitute compelled speech . . . .”); Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 67 
(“Elane Photography’s choice to offer its services to the public is a business decision, not a decision about 
its freedom of speech.”); Craig, No. CR 2013-0008 (“Respondents therefore have no valid claim that barring 
them from discriminating against same-sex customers violates their right to free exercise of religion.”).
10 For a critique of those arguments, see Domenick Scudera, How Is Discrimination a Religious 
Freedom?, huFFinGton PoSt (Feb. 20, 2014, 6:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/domenick-scudera/
how-is-discrimination-a-religious- freedom_b_4814976.html.
11 At the risk of “exclusion,” I will use both LGBT and “gay” to refer to persons whose sexual orientation 
is other than heterosexual or whose gender identity does not fit into the traditional categories of “male” and 
“female.” There are inevitable trade-offs between inclusive language and elegant, felicitous expression and 
I confess to sometimes erring on the side of simplicity and elegance.
12 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
13 See id. at 2766, 2785 (holding that the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate violated business 
owners’ religious beliefs under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
14 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (holding that per capita limits on political donations 
violated the First Amendment).
CatólicaLawReview02_1as provas.indb   38 18/05/17   10:06
39VOLUME I \ n.º 2 \ maio 2017
We don’t serve your kind here: Public Accommodations and the mark  
of Sodom \ Joseph William Singer
The close corporation—no matter how big, no matter how many employees, no 
matter how much it dominates a local economy—represents the property of the 
owners and is subject to their control.15 The Court assumed that owners have a 
right to decide how to spend their own money and the conditions on which they 
will—and will not—allow non-owners onto their premises.16
And yet the Supreme Court was careful to note that its decision in Hobby 
Lobby did not affect anti-discrimination laws, at least laws prohibiting racial dis-
crimination. As the majority held, “The Government has a compelling interest in 
providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to 
race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve 
that critical goal.”17 This holding suggests that property open to the public for 
the purpose of hiring employees is subject to reasonable regulations designed 
to ensure equal access to employment without regard to race. In effect, this line 
in the sand distinguishes the private home (where one can exclude people from 
one’s dinner party because of their race) from places of employment and, one 
assumes, places of public accommodation (where one cannot indulge in such 
discrimination). This means that the vision of property as under the control of the 
“owner” and subject to the owner’s “sole and despotic dominion,” as William 
Blackstone put it, cannot be the model for all property.18 Why is that?
The question is not rhetorical. The Hobby Lobby decision pointedly says 
nothing at all about sex, sexual orientation, or disability discrimination. And Sen-
ator Rand Paul famously said on the Rachel Maddow Show that civil rights laws 
are problematic because they impinge on both the property rights and the free 
speech rights of owners.19 The Supreme Court apparently agrees that owners of 
15 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (“[P]rotecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby 
Lobby . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.”).
16 See id.
17 Id. at 2783 (addressing the dissent’s concern about using religious practice as an excuse to 
discriminate).
18 2 William blackStone, commentarieS on the laWS oF enGland *2 (Univ. Chi. Press, 1st ed. 1979) (1765-
1769) (“There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, 
as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”). Some 
scholars have questioned whether Blackstone in fact conceptualized property rights as absolute. See 
Robert P. Burns, Blackstone’s Theory of the “Absolute” Rights of Property, 54 U. cin. L. rev. 67, 69 (1985); 
Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 yale L.J. 601, 603 (1998) (explaining 
the ways in which this famous quote deviates from Blackstone’s actual description of the laws of England).
19 Joseph William Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle in American Property Law, 1 ala. civ. rtS. & civ. 
liberty. L. rev. 91, 107 (2011) (stating that Senator Paul was soon forced to retreat from this assertion). 
Senator Paul’s comment sparked extensive controversy. See Jeff Jacoby, Editorial, Tough Stand: Freedom 
to Be Odious, boS. Globe, May 25, 2010, at 15 (defending Senator Paul’s comment on libertarian grounds); 
Adam Nagourney & Carl Hulse, Tea Party Pick Causes Uproar on Civil Rights, N.Y. timeS, May 21, 2010, at 
A1; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 
66 Stan. L. rev. 1205, 1221-22 (2014) (criticizing Senator Paul’s conception of property rights).
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businesses can express their religious values and exercise constitutionally pro-
tected speech through the ways in which they run their businesses and spend 
their money, and that anyone who wants to work for them has to follow their 
rules, albeit with some exceptions.20 You live in my house; you follow my rules. 
But access to the marketplace without regard to race seems to be an impor-
tant, indeed crucial, exception to this principle. It is of the highest importance to 
understand why that is so and what it means for our system of private property. 
To do that, we should consider what the world would look like if that principle 
were not true.
II. Mississippi, Apartheid, and Private Property Law
To this day, Mississippi has a statute that gives all businesses the right to 
choose their customers at will. At the risk of being pedantic, it is worth reading 
the statute in full.
(1) Every person, firm or corporation engaged in any public business, trade 
or profession of any kind whatsoever in the State of Mississippi, including, 
but not restricted to, hotels, motels, tourist courts, lodging houses, restau-
rants, dining room or lunch counters, barber shops, beauty parlors, theatres, 
moving picture shows, or other places of entertainment and amusement, 
including public parks and swimming pools, stores of any kind wherein mer-
chandise is offered for sale, is hereby authorized and empowered to choose 
or select the person or persons he or it desires to do business with, and is 
further authorized and empowered to refuse to sell to, wait upon or serve 
any person that the owner, manager or employee of such public place of 
business does not desire to sell to, wait upon or serve. The provisions of 
this section shall not apply to corporations or associations engaged in the 
business of selling electricity, natural gas, or water to the general public, or 
furnishing telephone service to the public.
(2) Any public place of business may, if it so desires, display a sign posted 
in said place of business serving notice upon the general public that “the 
management reserves the right to refuse to sell to, wait upon or serve any 
person,” however, the display of such a sign shall not be a prerequisite to 
exercising the authority conferred by this section.
(3) Any person who enters a public place of business in this state, or upon 
the premises thereof, and is requested or ordered to leave therefrom by the 
owner, manager or any employee thereof, and after having been so request-
20 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (analyzing the Hobby Lobby decision).
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ed or ordered to leave, refuses so to do, shall be guilty of a trespass and 
upon conviction therefor shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars 
($500.00) or imprisoned in jail not more than six (6) months, or both such 
fine and imprisonment.21
The statute was passed in 1956, almost two years after the decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education,22 which was decided six days before I was born. 
The statute is still on the books and still in effect, at least to the extent it has not 
been preempted by federal statutes or rendered unconstitutional, a question I 
shall return to in a moment.
What would the world be like if this law were universal? The answer is that 
it depends on how widespread discrimination is and who owns places of public 
accommodation and who does not. Let us suppose discriminatory attitudes are 
widespread and land is owned primarily by white persons who harbor such atti-
tudes. We know what such worlds are like because we have experienced them; 
they are the South before 1964 and South Africa at the time its anti- apartheid 
constitution came into effect in 1997, a scant eighteen years ago.
Professor Randall Kennedy vividly depicts that world in his article The Civil 
Rights Act’s Unsung Victory.23 To get ready to travel to South Carolina, Kenne-
dy’s parents packed an elaborate picnic to take in the car. They did so not for 
celebratory reasons or personal enjoyment, but because it was not clear that 
they would be able to find a place to eat when they got hungry. There might be 
restaurants along the way but many would not let them in or would serve them 
only at the back window or along with discourtesy, disparaging speech, and 
name-calling. There might not be hotels that would take them or gas stations 
that would fuel their cars. To be prepared and armed, they would take with them 
The Negro Motorist Green Book, a publication by Victor H. Green that identified 
establishments that served African American customers.24
In other words, they had to prepare to enter hostile territory where they were 
often unwelcome. More than that, they were disabled from accessing services 
that human beings need to live, including, food, shelter, bathrooms, and fuel. 
Their ability to travel was impaired, as was their ability to eat and sleep. Nor 
could they pass the day without encountering humiliating, degrading, and abas-
ing interactions that conveyed the message, over and over, that your kind are not 
21 miSS. code ann. § 97-23-17 (2011).
22 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate 
but equal’ has no place.”); Act of Feb. 21, 1956, ch. 257, 1956 Miss. Laws 307.
23 Randall Kennedy, The Civil Rights Act’s Unsung Victory, harPer’S maG., June 2014, at 35, 35.
24 See Kent Greenfield, Hobby Lobby and the Return of the “Negro Travelers’ Green Book,” am. ProSPect 
(Mar. 26, 2014), https://prospect.org/article/hobby-lobby-and-return- negro-travelers-green-book, 
archived at http://perma.cc/LE6K-JZ2N.
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welcome here.25 At the same time, facilities were available of a sort in the South 
and a family armed with the Green Book stood a chance of finding a private 
home or hotel where they could stay. What would have happened if such facili-
ties were not available? What if almost all the land was owned by white persons 
who thought the races should be separate and apart?
That was the case in South Africa at the time of the adoption of the interim 
constitution in 1993 and was still the case in 1997 when the permanent consti-
tution came into effect. Roughly ten percent of the people owned ninety percent 
of the land and the division was a racial one that had been created and imposed 
by law.26 Imagine what things were like in 1997 in South Africa. The new consti-
tution had abolished apartheid.27 Gone were the laws that required segregation. 
Did that have the effect of destroying the apartheid system? The answer is no.
At that point, the law of private property was neutral; it did not limit access to 
land based on race nor did it require owners to make racial distinctions. But the 
absence of a law requiring exclusion based on race does not mean that apart-
heid was gone. If white persons own ninety percent of the land and continue to 
deny black persons access to their property, then apartheid would continue una-
bated through the seemingly neutral operation of private property law. If owners 
have the right to choose their customers and if they have the right to exclude an-
yone they wish from their property, then apartheid could have continued almost 
unabated through protecting the right of owners to exclude non-owners from 
their land. Employers could still have refused to hire people based on their race; 
public accommodations could have refused to serve people because of their 
race; real estate owners could have refused to sell or rent to buyers or tenants 
because of their race. Private property law would have been an effective tool to 
maintain a society based on racial caste.28
That is the reason that the Mississippi statute is so appallingly out of place in 
2015. It is based on a misplaced assumption about the nature of private proper-
ty in a free and democratic society. It has been a long time since the Thirteenth 
Amendment was adopted and we have abolished not only slavery but also its 
25 See Domenick Scudera, This Is What Discrimination Feels Like, huFFinGton PoSt (Feb. 27, 2014, 
10:43 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/domenick-scudera/this-is-what- discrimination-feels-
like_b_4858240.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZBM-CV7P; see also Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering 
the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
127, 129 (1987) (discussing the harms of racially discriminatory service in stores, the rhetoric of privatization 
as a response to racial issues, and racism as a crime).
26 Q&A: Land Reform in South Africa, PBS (July 6, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/pov/promisedland/land_
reform.php, archived at http://perma.cc/Q48C- L9YT.
27 S. aFr. conSt. First Amendment Act of 1997 (establishing a bill of rights for all South African citizens).
28 On the ways that private property rules embody public law values (including equality), see Gregory S. 
Alexander, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values, 99 ioWa L. rev. 1257, 1260 (2014).
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“badges and incidents.”29 It has been a long time since the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 granted all persons the same right to contract as is enjoyed by white per-
sons and granted all citizens the same right to purchase real and personal prop-
erty as is enjoyed by white persons.30 Those statutes have been interpreted to 
require places of public accommodation to grant entrance to customers without 
regard to race.31
On the other hand, most federal courts have interpreted the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 not to require storeowners to treat customers equally without regard 
to race, finding no remedy when stores have engaged in racially discriminatory 
surveillance of customers, treated them to denigrating remarks, or denied them 
service.32 And the Civil Rights Act of 1964—the law we celebrate today— ap-
pears to provide no help here. It regulates inns, restaurants, gas stations, and 
places of entertainment but seems not to cover retail stores.33 If no federal stat-
ute preempts Mississippi law, then it remains legal in the state of Mississippi to 
discriminate on the basis of race in treatment of customers in stores—that is, 
unless the Mississippi statute is unconstitutional. But how can a law that fails to 
regulate owners constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection of 
law? Where is the “state action”?34 The state requires nothing; rather, it empow-
ers owners to control their own property and it liberates them from regulation. 
Any discriminatory decisions are made by the owners, not the state. Even Shel-
ley v. Kraemer35 acknowledged that voluntary private acts of discrimination fall 
outside the Equal Protection Clause.36
Perhaps we need not worry. Perhaps in this day and age, we can expect 
almost all businesses to eschew such discriminatory conduct and treatment. 
Norms have changed and it is simply bad business to treat customers with dis-
dain. And even if a few bad apples hold onto such appalling treatment, custom-
ers can still boycott and shop elsewhere. The market will discipline such stores 
29 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (“For [the Thirteenth Amendment’s Enabling 
Clause] clothed ‘Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and 
incidents of slavery in the United States.’” (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883))).
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (2012).
31 Singer, supra note 19, at 94.
32 Id. at 94-96 (arguing that courts have an inappropriately narrow conception of the right to contract).
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (mandating equal access to “lodgings; facilities principally engaged in selling food 
for consumption on the premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or entertainment; other covered 
establishments”).
34 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 12-14 (“[T]he prohibitions of the [Fourteenth Amendment] are 
against State laws and acts done under State authority.”).
35 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
36 Id. at 13 (“So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to 
their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the State and the provisions of the 
Amendment have not been violated.”).
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and the Internet will go wild in publicizing the conduct. Laws are hardly needed 
to control such behavior (one might argue). And those who persist will constitute 
a minority with little ability to make life difficult for African Americans. There is no 
need, one might think, for a new Green Book.37
There are two problems with this argument. First, the idea that the market 
controls all invidious discrimination is, and has always been, demonstrably false.38 
The market responds to the attitudes of customers. If one were interested in 
profits, and nothing else, then the Mississippi law makes the existence of dis-
crimination depend on the amount of discriminatory attitudes that exist in a given 
community. Such attitudes have waxed and waned with time. It is not as if there is 
no prejudice (say against Latinos) today. Discriminatory attitudes have persisted. 
Even today, few African Americans have lived without the experience of being 
accosted by the police, followed by security officers in a store, or treated badly 
from time to time by others who hold demeaning assumptions about them.39 
Studies show that unconscious discrimination continues to haunt us and that job 
applicants with equal resumes face different prospects because of assumptions 
about the race of the applicant.40 Even my students and colleagues at Harvard 
Law School and alumni of Harvard University have faced such treatment.41
Of course this means that neither law nor markets are sufficient to eradi-
cate invidious discrimination. We live, after all, in an age when discriminatory 
treatment is illegal in most of the country, including the overwhelming majority 
of states that prohibit discriminatory conduct of any kind in retail stores.42 That 
37 See Brooks v. Chi. Downs Ass’n, 791 F.2d 512, 519 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that a place of entertainment 
had no obligation to serve the public because “the market here is not so demonstrably imperfect that there 
is a monopoly or any allegation of consumer fraud”); Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 Stan. L. rev. 
1241, 1290 (2014) (arguing for allowing “private groups to select their own members and govern their own 
organizations when they provided uniquely differentiated services in competitive markets”).
38 See, e.g., Shalia Dewan, Discrimination in Housing Against Nonwhites Persists Quietly, U.S. Study 
Finds, N.Y. timeS, June 12, 2013, at B3 (discussing subtle discrimination faced by nonwhite homebuyers 
and renters); Catherine Ruetschlin, Markets Don’t Stop Racism but They Can Perpetuate It, demoS (Aug. 21, 
2014), http://www.demos.org/blog/8/21/14/markets-dont-stop-racism-they-can-perpetuate-it, archived 
at http://perma.cc/DZ42-FHDU (“The classically oblivious treatment of racism as an inefficiency that will be 
eroded in markets by the pursuit of profits has failed to produce results.”).
39 See Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C § 1981 to Cases of Consumer 
Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. third World L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (discussing the practice of consumer racial profiling 
and advocating the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to combat it).
40 Audrey J. Lee, Note, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 483-86 (2005) (examining the psychology of unconscious bias and its application in 
litigation strategy).
41 See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Harvard Professor Jailed; Officer Is Accused of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, July 
20, 2009, at A13 (addressing the Professor Henry Louis Gates arrest controversy).
42 See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 nW. 
U. L. rev. 1283, 1437-39 (1996) (reviewing state statutes that prohibit discriminatory conduct in retail stores).
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brings us to the second reason it is wrong to believe that we have no need for 
laws that prohibit discriminatory conduct in this day and age. The idea that one 
can “just go elsewhere” misses the point entirely. The question is not whether 
one can find a store willing to let you in and treat you with dignity.43 The question 
is whether one has a right to enter stores without worrying about such things.44 
The idea that storeowners are the lords of their castles—empowered to control 
their territory, exclude whoever they wish, and treat those inside as they deem 
proper and appropriate—contradicts the idea that every person is entitled to 
the same right as is enjoyed by white persons to enter the public world of the 
market without being treated as a being who is not human or is a member of a 
lower caste.45
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a myth developed that the public 
accommodation duty to serve the public was based on the need to respond to 
monopolies in areas of transportation and inns where no alternatives might be 
available, yet the need for service was widespread.46 That idea was used to jus-
tify narrowing the definition of a public accommodation to inns and common car-
riers; and, not coincidentally, this new conception allowed and encouraged new 
laws that allowed or required racial discrimination in places of entertainment, 
retail stores, and restaurants.47 But that interpretation of public accommodation 
law as combatting monopoly does not accord with its historic origins, which 
were based on the moral obligation of businesses that were open to the public 
to serve the public without discrimination.48 The monopoly theory suggests that, 
if we have competition, then “the market will take care of it” and new businesses 
will emerge that will serve the excluded group.49 It assumes that such groups 
should be content to go to places where they are welcome. This theory is incon-
sistent with the actual reason for public accommodation laws. These laws are 
not about giving despised groups a market niche; they are designed to ensure 
access to the world of the market without regard to invidious discrimination.50
43 Contra Epstein, supra note 37, at 1241, 1284 (arguing that public accommodation laws should 
combat monopolies but not interfere with discriminatory businesses, as long as competition leads to other 
businesses that do not discriminate—at least when segregationist impulses are not common).
44 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 19, at 108.
45 Id. at 108-09 (arguing for a “legal baseline that rejects market relations premised on unequal status”).
46 See Singer, supra note 42, at 1390, 1404-06 (“[B]efore the Civil War, the rule that common callings—
at least innkeepers and common carriers—had a duty to serve the public was universal . . . .”).
47 See id. at 1391-95, 1402-03.
48 See generally id. (detailing the nineteenth-century history of the public accommodation doctrine).
49 See Epstein, supra note 37, at 1241.
50 See Singer, supra note 42, at 1300-01 (arguing that owners have no general right to exclude people 
unreasonably if they open their property to the general public).
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Nor do public accommodation laws constitute invasive interferences with in-
dividual freedom or private property rights. Freedom of association is a bedrock 
constitutional principle but it is not a basis for claiming a right to establish mar-
ket structures that are premised on invidious discrimination.51 Our constitutional 
structure distinguishes between areas of social and political life where groups 
are presumptively entitled to be exclusionary (such as religion or political asso-
ciations) and areas of life where access without regard to race or other caste 
designations is presumptively prohibited—and the main area of life to which the 
equal access norm applies is the parts of the economy that are open to the 
general public.52
We have difficult line-drawing problems, to be sure. A wedding band may 
want to specialize in Klezmer music for use at Jewish weddings. A bakery may 
seek to sell goods only for use in religious services and seek to limit its wares to 
Christians. Because the First Amendment protects religious association, busi-
nesses that serve solely religious purposes may be entitled to do so. But busi-
nesses that generally offer their services to the public for all types of service, 
religious or nonreligious, enter a different area of social life. A bakery that sells 
goods to customers of all types for all purposes may well be obligated to serve 
the public regardless of the religion or sexual orientation of the customer.53
This is not to say that legislatures may not make reasonable distinctions 
between businesses that are obligated to serve the public without discrimina-
tion from those that may be allowed to define their customer base more exactly 
based on religious practice or doctrine. It does mean that we must define the 
parts of social life where we allow owners to exclude based on religion, political 
views and affiliation, or other associational interests, from the parts of social life 
where we require owners to open their property to anyone who is willing and 
able to seek their services in a non-disruptive manner. One thing is clear: stores 
that sell their wares to the public, which are not religious establishments, are 
firmly on the public side of the line.54
51 Epstein, for example, is wrong to suggest that public accommodation laws exceed their legitimate 
scope when they interpret “freedom of association” in an exclusionary manner in the marketplace. See 
Epstein, supra note 37, at 1247.
52 See Singer, supra note 42, at 1421 (“The purpose of the [Civil Rights Act] is to afford equal access to 
businesses that serve the general public.”).
53 See Craig, No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/
default/files/assets/initial_decision_case_no._cr_2013-0008.pdf (finding that a bakery is a place of public 
accommodation and required to serve the plaintiffs).
54 See, e.g., id.
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We live in a free and democratic society and that means that certain types 
of social relationships have been abolished. We no longer have slavery, feudal-
ism, or dictatorial paternal control of familial property and family members (such 
as wives and children); we have abolished the fee tail, granted women rights in 
property acquired during marriage, and prohibited indentured servitude, titles 
of nobility, caste systems, and monopolistic control of land.55 Laws outlawing 
these arrangements can only be effective if we also shape the law of private 
property to ensure that it cannot be a means to effectuate these banished social 
arrangements.56
What is demanded by a free and democratic society is the right not to ex-
perience the humiliation of being turned away from a place open to all others 
because of characteristics about oneself that should be irrelevant to the oppor-
tunity to buy a shirt in a store. This does not amount to “forced association.”57 
That framing of the issue suggests that storeowners are free in a democracy 
to choose their customers at will. But that is not the case. Allowing stores to 
choose their customers at will deprives excluded groups from the freedom to 
walk into a store that appears to be open to the public and get service.58 If 
“forced association” is at issue, then consider that the absence of a public ac-
commodation law forces a patron to look for some other place that will let her 
in.59 Freedom is not just negative, or the freedom of property owners from regu-
lation of use of their property; freedom is also positive and includes the freedom 
to enter the marketplace on the same terms as those who do not have to worry 
about arbitrary exclusion because of the color of their skin.60
Telling someone they can just go to another store or try another nightclub is 
like telling someone to eat soup with a fork. It is a solution that does not solve the 
problem; it is an answer to the wrong question. The issue is not whether the cus-
tomer is likely to find another store that will take her in. The question is whether a 
storeowner has a right, in a free and democratic society, to treat a customer like 
a pariah. The answer is no.
55 See, e.g., U.S. conSt. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (banning titles of nobility); U.S. conSt. amend. XIII (abolishing 
slavery); Singer, supra note 19, at 106-07 (arguing that these reforms established a legal baseline for a free 
society).
56 Singer, supra note 19, at 107-08.
57 Epstein, supra note 37, at 1256 (objecting to such laws because they lead to “negative-sum games”).
58 See Singer, supra note 19, at 109.
59 See id.
60 See id. (“It should be abundantly evident that the basic policy of United States law is to grant equal 
access to the marketplace without regard to race.”); Ian Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, Stan. 
encycloPedia Phil. (Mar. 5, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/ (explaining 
positive freedoms).
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III. Customer choice and equal protection of the laws
What does this mean for the Mississippi statute? It means that the statute 
harkens back to a way of life we have abandoned for good. The statute embraces 
values we have rejected and a conception of the marketplace and private proper-
ty that is, in principle, incompatible with a society that has formally abolished the 
“badges and incidents of slavery.”61 But now the vaunted state action doctrine 
rears its ugly head. When the state authorizes choice, how is it denying rights? 
The answer has already been given. South Africa would have never gotten rid of 
apartheid if it had left private property owners free to discriminate on the basis of 
race in public accommodations, employment, and housing. Allowing owners to 
make choices when they control property that is rightly in the public sphere dele-
gates sovereign power that cannot be delegated.62 It turns owners into lords and 
our Constitution prohibits any government to grant any title of nobility.63
Aficionados of “original intent” theories of constitutional interpretation fail to 
understand the vast extent to which our norms of equality have changed over 
time. The Supreme Court has struck down laws that give husbands the power 
to control their wives’ property—laws that were commonplace both at the time 
the Equal Protection Clause was adopted in 1791 and when the Fourteenth 
Amendment came into force in 1868.64 It has rejected the “separate but equal” 
doctrine65 and segregationist zoning laws.66 It has rejected discriminatory but 
facially neutral laws such as state laws that enforced racially restrictive cove-
nants and prohibitions on marriage between persons of different races.67 It has 
prohibited discrimination based on disability.68
61 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
62 See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 cornell L.Q. 8, 10-11 (1927) (arguing that 
laissez-faire judicial doctrine prohibiting minimum wage laws on property rights grounds passed “a certain 
domain of sovereignty from the state to the private employer of labor).
63 U.S. conSt. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; see also Joseph William Singer, Titles of Nobility: Poverty, Immigration, 
and Property in a Free and Democratic Society, 1 J.L. ProP. & Soc’y 1, 13 (2014) (analogizing the modern 
treatment of immigrants to medieval nobility’s treatment of commoners).
64 See Singer, supra note 42, at 1299.
65 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We have now announced that such segregation is 
a denial of the equal protection of the laws.”).
66 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (“We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the 
property in question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, and 
is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
67 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding that anti-miscegenation laws violate the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 
20 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
68 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (finding that the city denied the 
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Complementing these historical changes in equal protection law has been 
expanding statutory protection from invidious discrimination. While the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 has a short list of public accommodations, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 has a much longer list that includes retail stores, 
doctors and lawyers’ offices, universities, and insurance companies.69 I have 
previously argued that the 1964 Act is ambiguous as to whether its list is ex-
haustive or illustrative.70 Given the changing statutory definitions of what is a 
public accommodation, I would advise any judge who confronted the issue to 
interpret the 1964 act to include retail stores. In my view, the 1964 act has 
been implicitly amended by the later statutes that clarify Congress’s current view 
about what is and is not a “public accommodation” with obligations to serve the 
public without invidious discrimination.71 Failing that, I would hold the Missis-
sippi anti-public-accommodations law to be an unconstitutional denial of equal 
protection of the laws insofar as it authorizes places open to the public to deny 
service on the basis of race.72
Wesley Hohfeld taught us that privileges are as much laws as rights are 
laws.73 Privileges confer liberties and may seem to remove state regulation.74 
Under that view, law only reaches so far as it coerces us to act in one way or 
another. That means much of life is unregulated by law and beyond the reach 
of the Equal Protection Clause. But Hohfeld taught us that liberties are laws 
insofar as they leave others vulnerable to the effects of the exercise of those 
respondent’s building permit on the basis of animus against the mentally disabled, and that such a denial 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
69 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2012).
70 See Singer, supra note 42, at 1412-24.
71 See id.
72 Cf. Johan van der Walt, the horizontal eFFect revolution and the queStion oF SovereiGnty (2014) 
(exploring recent developments in constitutional jurisprudence in various nations that incorporate regulation 
of private relationships); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. 
rev. 669, 670-71 (2014) (arguing that constitutional equality norms have consequences for laws that create 
or reinforce class inequalities and oligarchic concentrations of power or that prevent individuals from having 
an equal chance to acquire wealth and participate in economic life); Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal 
Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 mich. L. rev. 387, 390-91 (2003) (arguing that the “law” part of “equal 
protection of law” includes common law and that includes the law of private property and other laws that 
regulate relations among persons); Stephen Gardbaum, Where the (State) Action Is, 4 intl. J. conSt. L. 
760, 762 (2006) (discussing various conceptions of the application of constitutional norms to relations 
among private parties and laws regulating those relationships); Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal 
World, 99 ioWa L. rev. 1021, 1023-24 (2014) (arguing that rule of law ideals require attention to questions 
of substantive equality in social relationships).
73 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 yale L.J. 16, 30-37 (1913) (discussing the relationship between privileges and rights); 
Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 
1982 WIS. L. rev. 975, 986 (analyzing Hohfeldian theories of rights).
74 See Hohfeld, supra note 73, at 30-37 (“[A] privilege is the opposite of a duty.”).
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liberties.75 Recall that South Africa could and would have continued apartheid if 
private property owners were free to exclude others at will. The Mississippi stat-
ute denies equality because it denies persons the “same right to contract” and 
to “purchase real and personal property” as persons who do not face systemic 
discrimination. Those with the right to exclude exert power over non- owners 
and this exercise of a right to exclude is not a self-regarding act. Done in concert 
with others’ acts, it creates a racial caste system.
The Mississippi statute was designed to promote a racial caste system. It 
enshrines a right that is incompatible with the law of a free and democratic so-
ciety that treats each person with equal concern and respect and which rejects 
racial caste, apartheid, and segregation. The Mississippi statute, if it means what 
it says, would require someone to write and to publish an updated Green Book. 
As things stand, LGBT persons actually need such books. About half the states 
allow discrimination based on sexual orientation and no federal law stands in the 
way of such discrimination.76 Many websites describe places where gay people 
can feel welcome and implicitly or explicitly let people know where they are not 
wanted.77 We have not moved entirely beyond the world where the Green Book 
was needed.
We spend so much time lauding freedom of choice that we sometimes for-
get that “[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all [human beings] are 
created equal” and that a society that has abolished lords and commoners and 
racial caste has made a decision of consequence to daily life.78 Our fundamen-
tal commitment to the equal status of all persons means that some property 
rights cannot be created in a free and democratic society. And the Mississippi 
statute therefore is not a “deregulatory” law that grants owners freedom to act 
as they like. It is a regulatory law that establishes a private property right that is 
itself inconsistent with equal protection of law. The Mississippi statute does not 
deregulate or liberate; it empowers individuals to create property rights that en-
tail domination over others. It authorizes oppression and that cannot withstand 
equal protection analysis, as I understand it.
Giving owners the freedom to treat customers as they wish and to exclude 
on any basis they choose is incompatible with the minimum standards for so-
cial and civil relationships characteristic of free and democratic societies that 
have abolished racial castes. Such societies do not allow apartheid to operate 
75 See Singer, supra note 73, at 987-89 (“[I]f A has the privilege to do certain acts or to refrain from doing 
those acts, B is vulnerable to the effects of A’s actions.”).
76 JoSePh William SinGer, ProPerty §2.6.4, at 78 (4th ed. 2014).
77 See, e.g., GayFriendlyGuide.COM, http://www.gayfriendlyguide.com (last visited Apr. 24, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/FWN6-HYJN (listing businesses that are “genuinely gay-welcoming”).
78 the declaration oF indePendence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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through means of private property law. No law, including private property law, 
can establish a caste system. Property that is not open to the public is not sub-
ject to equality norms but property that is open to the public becomes subject 
to the law of civil rights.79 The freedom to exclude someone from a public ac-
commodation on the basis of race is simply not a property right that a free and 
democratic society can recognize, any more than it recognizes titles of nobility 
or heredity public offices. And any statute that authorizes the creation of such a 
property right is therefore unconstitutional.
IV. Burbclaves, FOQNES, and King William
Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash is one of the most ingenious and influen-
tial science fiction novels ever written.80 In addition to describing the Internet 
and Second Life before they even existed, he imagined a world of fragment-
ed sovereignty and absolute property rights.81 In his fictional world, the United 
States no longer holds full sovereignty over its territory; rather, sovereignty is 
divided among many claimants that include corporations, churches, and private 
armies.82 The land is dotted with “Burbclaves” or private, enclosed towns that 
exercise the right to exclude and rule absolutely within their borders.83 Those 
towns may ally with each other and give their citizens the freedom to enter their 
scattered towns and territories. One could be a citizen of McDonald’s, for ex-
ample, or the Catholic Church and be accepted in the Burbclaves that pledge 
allegiance to those sovereigns.
Stephenson also invented the idea of the franchise-owned quasi-national 
entities (“FOQNEs”).84 These corporate entities effectively declared independ-
ence from state and federal law and became sovereigns of their own. Inside its 
territory, the law of McDonald’s rules supreme, immune from external regula-
79 See Singer, supra note 19, at 93 (positing that our conception of the obligations that businesses have 
changed after the passage of the Civil Rights Acts).
80 neal StePhenSon, SnoW craSh (1992); see also The Word on Snow Crash and Google Earth, 
realityPrime (Sept. 27, 2007, 1:07 AM), http://www.realityprime.com/blog/2007/09/the-word-on-snow-
crash-and-google-earth/, archived at http://perma.cc/6FXT-9BA8 (explaining how Snow Crash inspired 
aspects of Google Earth).
81 See StePhenSon, supra note 80, at 24 (describing the “Metaverse,” a fictional analogue to the Internet).
82 See id. at 44-45.
83 See id. at 6 (describing the undesirability of living outside of the Burbclaves); id. at 13 (illustrating how 
security police exclude outsiders); id. at 48 (portraying a Burbclave police officer threatening deadly force 
against a protagonist).
84 Id. at 14-15.
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tion.85 The law of the road was another thing entirely; roads are privately owned 
and you can choose which road company you want to use.86 Once you do, you 
follow their rules—or their lack of rules.
Why do I bring up Neal Stephenson and the Snow Crash world? I do so 
because the Mississippi statute depicts a world that could devolve into the world 
of Burbclaves and FOQNEs. That world resembles the feudal state created by 
William the Conqueror. King William granted lords power over their territory; that 
power combined what we would consider to be sovereign governing power 
with the rights that go along with ownership of property. Such lords had the 
right to exclude others and to rule absolutely inside the manor as long as they 
complied with their obligations to the king. The same is true of the Burbclaves 
and FOQNEs. They not only control land; they rule it. They determine who can 
enter and what they can do there. While that seems innocent when applied to 
the private home, it leads to pernicious consequences when extended to whole 
towns or suburbs.
Rather than existing as a citizen of a state who has the freedom to travel, to 
choose where to live, and to know that one will be treated equally with others 
wherever one chooses to settle, the Snow Crash world is a world of castes. You 
must petition to become a citizen of a FOQNE or other fragmented state.87 If they 
let you in, you have the protection they offer; if they do not let you in, you are out 
in no man’s land or some corporation’s road. It is not clear that there is a place 
where you are entitled to be. And as Jeremy Waldron taught us, “[e]verything 
that is done has to be done somewhere.”88 If property law does not ensure 
access to property somewhere, then the law has outlawed your existence. It 
has made a person illegal. Democracies may regulate conduct but they cannot 
make it illegal for a person to exist. In the Snow Crash world, where you can 
travel depends on where you are welcome. Burbclaves that have many locations 
allow their citizens relatively open freedom of movement but those that are small 
or do not have many locations therefore have citizens that cannot leave without 
depending on the kindness of strangers.
What does it mean to never know, when one enters a store, whether one is 
welcome? How does it affect us if we cannot count on being able to buy food, 
or clothing, or a computer? How will our life chances and worldview change if 
our ability to obtain the things we need depended on how much prejudice there 
was against us? I grew up in the state of New Jersey because my father could 
not find a company that would hire a Jewish engineer in the early 1950s. But the 
85 Id. at 44-45.
86 See id. at 7.
87 See id. at 6-7.
88 Jeremy Waldron, Homeless and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. rev. 295, 296 (1991).
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federal government hired Jews at the Electronics Command at Fort Monmouth, 
and both Bell Laboratories and Edison Laboratories hired Jewish engineers. My 
father and mother left New York City because no one would let them in. New 
York did not prohibit discrimination in employment against Jews. This means it 
authorized the creation of private property rights that were closed to those of a 
certain caste. Without a job one cannot eat or live. New York adopted a law that 
freed its companies to discriminate. That authorized New York to create property 
rights that gave companies power over others. Because New York adopted this 
private property system, my father and mother could not stay there. New York 
evicted my parents.
We live in a world that still retains a high degree of discrimination against gay 
people. And almost half the states have no laws prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation; nor do federal laws provide such protection.89 Some 
gay people can avoid discrimination by covering or staying in the closet. They 
can “pass” and enter commerce in secrecy. Of course, that kind of self-suppres-
sion has a cost.90 And in those states that do not have antidiscrimination laws, 
LGBT persons who cannot pass, or do not want to do so, never know as they 
walk down the street what stores will welcome them or who will become violent 
if they hold hands or express affection in public. The world is uncertain, the wel-
come mat invisible, and life often nasty and brutish. Safe places are becoming 
more common. Anyone who enters a place like Provincetown, Massachusetts, 
can experience what it is like to walk into a free state where people do not 
have to hide and where they do not have to fear exclusion or rejection from the 
properties we need to enter during our daily lives. Public accommodation laws, 
including the 1964 Civil Rights Act, intend to create such a world; they intend 
to destroy or prevent the establishment of Neal Stephenson’s fragmented reality 
and partial citizenship. One cannot live freely, safely, or comfortably if one needs 
a Green Book to travel through one’s day.
89 Employment Non-Discrimination Act, hum. rtS. camPaiGn (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.hrc.org/
resources/entry/employment-non-discrimination-act, archived at http://perma.cc/9TE7-LS9R (“There is no 
federal law that consistently protects LGBT individuals from employment discrimination; there are no state 
laws in 29 states that explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation . . . .”).
90 Brian Krans, Coming Out of the Closet Could Help You Live Longer, healthline (Feb. 4, 2013), http://
www.healthline.com/health-news/coming-out-increases-mental-well-being-020413, archived at http://
perma.cc/XL9B-R4AK (stating that people who are open about their sexuality “experience fewer symptoms 
of depression, anxiety, and burnout”).
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V. The mark of Sodom
The only time the Supreme Court considered the question of whether public 
accommodation laws violate the U.S. Constitution because they constitute tak-
ings of property without just compensation was in the case of Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States.91 In that case, the Court dismissed the takings claim 
in a single sentence. The opinion explains simply: “Neither do we find any merit 
in the claim that the Act is a taking of property without just compensation. The 
cases are to the contrary.”92 The cases cited by the Court concern cases where 
the need for government regulation was evident and important and the uncom-
pensated burden on the owner was justified by the reasons underlying the public 
regulation. As to public accommodations laws that prohibit race discrimination, 
the public interest is apparently compelling, so clearly so that the majority of 
the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby could dismiss, in another single sentence, 
the idea that anyone might assert religious interests in racial discrimination in 
employment.93 “The Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal 
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibi-
tions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.”94
While one might argue that the interest in equal access to public accom-
modations, employment, and housing justifies limiting property rights, a more 
appropriate conclusion is that “[p]roperty rights serve human values. They are 
recognized to that end, and are limited by it.”95 Contrary to what Senator Paul 
believes, civil rights laws do not limit property rights.96 They define what property 
rights can exist in a free and democratic society. They establish the structural 
baseline, the infrastructure of a society that is committed to granting equal pro-
tection of the laws.
In the world of King William and in the world of FOQNEs, property rights are 
as absolute as the various powers that be can make them. Those who own/rule 
91 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (upholding a public accommodations law on basis of the Commerce 
Clause).
92 Id. at 261 (citing United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168-69 (1958) (holding that 
wartime restrictions during World War II on the operation of gold mines did not constitute takings); Omnia 
Com. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510 (1923) (holding that government interruption of a steel 
production contract for wartime needs during World War I did not constitute a taking); Legal Tender Cases, 
79 U.S. (12 Wall) 457, 551 (1870) (holding that paper money printing during the Civil War did not constitute 
a taking)).
93 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
94 Id.
95 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (overturning criminal trespass convictions for 
defendants who walked on to a farmer’s land to give medical and legal aid to indigent farmworkers).
96 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
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towns can act as they please with their own—and with those they allow to enter 
their domains. But that is not our world.
In our world—the world where we hold some truths to be self-evident—the 
power to exclude or to treat someone in a disparaging manner because of their 
race does not extend to business property open to the public. It is not a property 
right that can be recognized or granted legal recognition in a free and democrat-
ic society. It is incompatible with a society that has abolished racial caste and 
which ensures in its Constitution that all persons are entitled to equal protection 
of the laws—a right interpreted by the Reconstruction Congress as encompass-
ing the rights to contract and to purchase personal property on the same basis 
as is enjoyed by those who have not suffered historic discrimination.97
A state that pretends to grant everyone equal rights but that in effect denies 
a segment of the population the liberties, the freedoms, the securities associated 
with daily life deals in tarnished goods. We might better understand this point by 
considering a midrash, a rabbinic story, about the reason for the destruction of 
the town of Sodom. The rabbis argued that Sodom was destroyed because it 
did not understand the limits of property rights.98
The Talmud says that the person who is strict about property rights says “[w]
hat’s mine is mine, and what’s yours is yours.”99 But then the Talmud goes on to 
say something startling: “some say this is the mark of the people of Sodom.”100 
For a religion like Judaism that accepts private property, that makes the injunc-
tion not to steal one of its ten most central commands,101 how could respect for 
“mine and thine” be the mark of a people so irredeemable that God saw fit to 
destroy them?
Ezekiel explains that Sodom was rich but cruel. “[S]he and her daughters 
had pride, surfeit of food, and prosperous ease, but did not aid the poor and the 
needy.”102 The rabbis tell us the people of Sodom prohibited charity; they took 
“what is mine is mine” to an extreme. When the people of Sodom saw a young 
woman give food to a starving neighbor, they burnt her alive.103 Charity was 
against the law in Sodom.104 What is mine is mine and what is yours is yours.
97 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
98 See Pirke avot, supra note 2, at 5:13 (“Those who say ‘What’s mine is mine, and what’s yours is 
yours’; this is the average [type of person], though some say this is the type predominant in Sodom.”).
99 Id.
100 Id. (contrasting one who is strict about property rights to the fool, the saint, and the wicked types) 
(translation by author).
101 Exodus 20:15 (“Thou shall not steal.”).
102 Ezekiel 16:49.
103 MIDRASH RABBAH, Genesis (Vayera), 49:6 (Rabbi Dr. H. Freedman, trans., Soncino Press 3d ed. 
1983).
104 Id. at 49:6 n.3 (“[T]hey had strictly forbidden charity . . . .”).
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The rabbis tell us further that the people of Sodom gave coins to the poor 
but they wrote their names on those coins.105 When the coins were offered to 
the storeowners for bread, the shopkeepers would see the names and refuse 
to accept the marked money.106 The poor had money in their hands, but no one 
would take it, no one would sell to them, no one would let them in, and the poor 
would die in the street.107 And then the residents would come to take back their 
money.108
The Talmud tells us that what is mine is mine and what is yours is yours.109 
But the Torah also tells us: Al tonu ish et akhiv. Do not wrong your brother.110 
This commandment is the source of many Talmudic regulations mandating fair 
transactions in the marketplace. And the obligation extends to strangers as well 
as kin. After all, Leviticus 19:34 tells us that “[t]he stranger who resides with you 
shall be as one of your citizens; you shall love him as yourself.”111 We are obli-
gated to treat others as we would want to be treated. That principle applies as 
much to the marketplace as to other areas of life, and it applies to strangers as 
much as it does to citizens.
Our society embraces these norms by requiring all laws to recognize the 
equal status of each person. The society that provides stores and businesses 
open to the public cannot contradict that message by allowing owners to ex-
clude people unless they have good reason to do so. The owner who hangs a 
shingle and offers her services to the public cannot retreat from the promise of 
open service; to do so is to offer the public marked money. It is to convey the 
promise of a free and open society and then take the prize away from the de-
spised few. A free and democratic society abolishes titles of nobility, outlaws so-
cial castes and racial apartheid, and promotes equal access to the free market.




109 Pirke avot, supra note 2, at 5:13.
110 Leviticus 25:14 (“When you sell property to your neighbor, or buy any from your neighbor, you shall not 
wrong one another.”); JPS hebreW-enGliSh tanakh (Jewish Publication Society 2000).
111 Id. at 19:34.
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Conclusion
Markets are free not because they are unregulated but because they are 
open to all. Property is private not because owners can do anything they like 
on their property but because property law promotes the legitimate interests of 
persons who have chosen to live together in a free and democratic society that 
ensures that each person is due equal concern and respect. Private property 
that is open to the public and which serves the public provides a vehicle for 
social life as well as economic production and distribution. Because we do not 
have a racial caste system, public accommodations must be open to all. Public 
accommodations law is not a nice extra that we can be happy the Congress 
passed in 1964. Nor does it limit the rights of property owners. It defines what 
property rights are compatible with the truths that we hold self-evident and our 
commitment to freedom, equality, and democracy. The public accommodations 
law of 1964 has become, and will always be, a bulwark of our democratic sys-
tem of government and our free and democratic way of life. That is why the 
Mississippi anti-public-accommodation law cannot mean what it says and that 
is why it cannot serve as a legal basis for discrimination in a retail store.
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